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ECONOMIES OF SCALE: WEIGHING OPERATING
EFFICIENCY WHEN ENFORCING ANTITRUST LAW
"[I]t has been the law for centuries that a [person] may set up a business in a
country town too small to support more than one, although thereby ... [intending]
to ruin some one already there and [succeeding in that] intent. In such a case [the
competitor] is not held to act 'unlawfully and without justifiable cause .... The
reason, of course, is that the doctrine generally has been accepted that free competi-
tion is worth more to society than it costs, and that on this ground the infliction of
the damage is privileged." *
INMODUCION
Economists have long recognized the antitrust dilemma that it is
impossible to promote perfect competitionI when large economies of
scale are present.' Because economists generally believe that anti-
trust policy should reinforce the achievement of scale economies,3
they encourage only workable competition when large scale econo-
mies exist.4 Courts, although traditionally emphasizing populist goals
in antitrust enforcement, such as protecting small business,' recently
* Vegelaln v. Guntuer, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
1. Perfect competition is achieved when four conditions exist: the product of
each seller is fungible; no buyer or seller has a sufficiently large part of the total
market to influence price; all resources can readily enter, leave, or switch uses in the
market; and perfect knowledge of relevant economic and technological data exists
among all consumers and producers. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 402a
(1978); E. Mansfield, Microeconomics 234-35 (2d ed. 1975); P. Samuelson, Econom-
ics 43 (9th ed. 1973).
2. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 103; R. Bork, The Antitrust Para-
dox 7-8 (1978); P. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 48; Asch, Industrial Concentration,
Efficiency, and Antitrust Reform, 22 Antitrust-Bull. 129, 130-31 (1977); see J.
McGee, In Defense of Industrial Concentration 18 (1971) (public policy choice in
some industries may lie between fewer firms with lower costs and more firms with
higher costs).
3. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 401; R. Bork, supra note 2, at
192; C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy (1965); Williamson, Symposium on
Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 918 (1979).
4. P. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 48. Workable competition is reasonably effec-
tive competition that has some imperfect elements. Specifically, some buyers or sell-
ers in the market may be large enough to influence price. Id. at 47-48. A market is
workably competitive if, among others, there are at least as many buyers and sellers
as scale economies permit; entry is reasonably free; predatory tactics are not used;
inefficient buyers and sellers are not protected; production and distribution opera-
tions are efficient; demand controls quantity and quality of production; and profits
are at a level sufficient to provide a reasonable return on investment. F. Scherer,
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 42 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as F. Scherer I].
5. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-77 (1966); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 278-79 & n.6 (1964); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 & n.42 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
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also have emphasized economic values when interpreting antitrust
law, including increased tolerance of aggressive business
competition.- As a result, courts faced with a choice between limit-
ing the size of a firm to achieve a competitive market structure and
preserving and protecting operating efficiency are increasingly likely
to protect efficiency.7 Even the National Commission for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, which rejects standard rule of
reason analysis, expressly suggests efficiency as the sole defense to a
proposed no-fault actual monopolization charge.8 To be meaningful,
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-17 (1962); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 322-23 (1897); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945); R. Bork, supra note 2, at 4. This emphasis is consistent
with congressional intent expressed prior to enactment of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976), H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1955); Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7 (1966); Sullivan, Eco-
nomics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Anti-
trust?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214, 1219-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan 1], the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 306-08 (1960); Turner, Con-
glomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1326
(1965), and the Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976). 96 Cong. Rec.
16444, 16448, 16450, 16452, 16503 (1950); 95 Cong. Rec. 11486, 11489, 11494-95,
11498 (1949). But see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962)
(supporters of § 7 in congressional debates stated that it would not impede a merger
between two small companies to enable the combination to compete more effec-
tively); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 104 (courts have given efficiency
priority over populist goals). See generally R. Bork, supra note 2, at 5.
6. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-75 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v.
IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1979); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental
T.V., Inc. 537 F.2d 980, 997 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927-28 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1008-10 (N.D. Cal.
1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 433-34
(N.D. Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. Memorex v. IBM Corp., Nos. 78-350, 78-3236, slip
op. at 992 (9th Cir., Nov. 10, 1980); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 987, F-i, F-10 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 1980); Sullivan,
Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships,
68 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan II]; Comment, Draining the
Alcoa "Wishing Well": The Section 2 Conduct Requirement After Kodak and Cal-
comp, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1979). Traditional antitrust enforcement downplayed
the significance of abusive practices and emphasized the mere existence of monopoly
power. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). The change in emphasis by the courts in recent cases results in part from their
greater emphasis on overt abusive acts and a toleration of monopoly power in the
absence of such acts.
7. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 104.
8. National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Re-
port to the President and the Attorney General 152 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
National Commission Report]. The Commission was created to consider
" revision . . . of substantive [antitrust] law needed to expedite the resolution of
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however, legal standards based on efficiency concepts must more
carefully consider the work of economists.9
This Note argues that scale economies should be considered when
determining liability and relief under section 2 of the Sherman Act"
complex cases and . . . proposals for making the remedies available in such cases
more effective.' " Id. at 143 (footnote omitted) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,022, §
2(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 155-56 (1977 Compilation), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,052,
43 Fed. Reg. 15,133 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1978)). The National Commission felt "that
doctrinal changes in antitrust should be made primarily on the basis of their rela-
tionship to the fundamental goals of antitrust-including economic efficiency, con-
sumer welfare, and dispersion of social, economic, and political power-rather than
solely, or even mainly, for purposes of expediting litigation or making relief more
effective." Id. at 143 (emphasis added). The Commission's no-fault proposal would
require divestiture once persistent monopoly power was shown unless divestiture
was shown to destroy substantial scale economies or benefits accruing from a patent.
Id. at 152.
9. Enforcement of the antitrust laws should be aimed at controlling imperfec-
tions in the free market system. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 7 C'T]he only legitimate
goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare."); C. Kaysen & D. Turner,
supra note 3, at 3-5 (only in the context of a free market system is it worthwhile to
emphasize antitrust policy). Rational trade regulation policy mandates the application
of sound economic analysis to antitrust cases. See R. Bork, supra note 2. at 4, 7.
"[R]ules [of law] that significantly impair both competition and the ability of the
economy to produce goods and services efficiently [have been made by the courts
based] on demonstrably erroneous notions of the economics that guide the law.
... Unless the theory of antitrust is understood and the law brought into line with
it, the law will [become] even more unnecessarily restrictive of business
freedom.... A consumer-oriented law must employ basic economic theory to judge
which market structures and practices are harmful and which beneficial." Id. at 4-7.
Indeed, economic analysis has taken an increasingly prominent role in antitrust law.
L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 1, at 1-2, 8-9 (1977) ("Habits of
thought, techniques of analysis, and value preferences derived from economics have
come increasingly to play a substantial part in the development and application of the
law. Today, one interested in antitrust cannot ignore economics... Increasingly ...
courts have turned toward theoretical economics for insight and aid in the develop-
ment of antitrust doctrine."). But see R. Bork, supra note 2, at 4-5 (an irrational
argument has been advanced that antitrust law should ignore economics and antitrust
lawsuits should be brought sporadically and indiscriminately to keep business in
line); Note, Potential Production: A Supply Side Approach for Relevant Product
Market Definitions, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 1199, 1204 n.22 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
Potential Production] ("Judges, not economists, decide antitrust law. Case analysis,
therefore, is the proper starting point."); L. Sullivan, supra, § 1, at 7-8 ("[C]ourts
can only function effectively in areas where the applicable values are clearly and
authoritatively identified and where critical factual questions are sufficiently deter-
minate so that use of the ordinary devices for judicial inquiry, characterization, rule
making and rule application will yield results which are predictable and which de-
monstrably turn on principles of general application.").
10. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)
(emphasis added).
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and section 7 of the Clayton Act." The Note begins with a discus-
sion of economic theory relating to scale economy concepts- the re-
lationship of these concepts to economic goals, the various types of
scale economies, and the measurement of these economies. This eco-
nomic theory is next applied in an antitrust context. Scale economy
concepts already are controlling in cases in which their economic
effect is clear. When their effect is less clear, scale economy concepts
are still useful for determining whether a firm has market power,
whether aggressive business acts are justified by market structure,
and whether an action has a net procompetitive effect.
I. ECONOMIC TREATMENT OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE
A. Underlying Economic Theory
Scale economies are decreases in per unit cost resulting from in-
creases in quantity produced or distributed.'2  They are one aspect of
11. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that "[n]o corporation shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock . . . other share capital
[or] . . . the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). This Note only considers scale
economies in the context of § 2 and § 7. Scale economies may also be relevant in
cases involving § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is . . . declared to be
illegal. ... (emphasis added)), § 1(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(0
(1976) ("It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section." (emphasis added)), § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) ("unfair methods of competition in . . . commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . . commerce, are declared unlawful"
(emphasis added)), § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976)("It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or
make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or
other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale
within the United States . . . where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale
or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen coin-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." (emphasis added)).
12. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration [hereinafter cited
as Scherer I], in Industrial Concentration: The New Learning 16, 16 (H. Cold-
schmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Industrial
Concentration]; see F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 81; cf. P. Samuelson, supra note
1, at 28 ("[e]conomies or savings come into full play only when a large enough num-
ber of units is being produced to make it worth while to set up a fairly elaborate
productive organization" (emphasis omitted)); Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L.
& Econ. 54, 54 (1958) ("The theory of economies of scale is the theory of the rela-
tionship between the scale of use of a properly chosen combination of all productive
services and the rate of output of the enterprise.").
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what economists term operating efficiencies."3 Optimal scale is
achieved when size permits long run average total cost 4 to be at a
minimum; minimum optimal scale is achieved at the smallest size
that permits these average total costs. ' There are two general types
of efficiencies resulting from scale economies.' 6 "Real" economies
13. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 402b2 (1978); cf. R. Bork, supra
note 2, at 104-05 (defining productive efficiency as an activity by business that cre-
ates wealth). Economists generally recognize two types of efficiency-operating effi-
ciency and allocative efficiency--which, in conjunction, are thought to create an
overall efficiency that determines the level of society's wealth. This Note does not
address allocative efficiency, which is achieved when no reallocation of inputs and
outputs would increase aggregate consumer welfare. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 1, 402bl. This generally occurs when a large enough number of sellers and
buyers exists in each market so that no individual seller's output decisions have a
perceptible influence on price, and resources are mobile. Under these conditions, a
firm will maximize profits when marginal cost, which is the added cost of the last
unit of output, equals price. Because resources are mobile, a market in which profits
exceed total costs will attract entrants. When the economy is in equilibrium, price is
equal to marginal cost for all goods and services, and consumer welfare is maximized
because price reflects the value of each product to the marginal buyer. Id. Econo-
mists have recognized the goal of antitrust enforcement as improving allocative effi-
ciency without impairing operating efficiency so greatly as to negate the gain in con-
sumer welfare. Thus, punishing concentration, and reinforcing atomistic competition,
implies that potential gains in allocative efficiency should not be overwhelmed by
losses in operating efficiency. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 91. See generally MeKie,
Organization and Efficiency, 38 S. Econ. J. 449, 452 (1972); Weiss, Optimal Plant
Size and the Extent of Suboptimal Capacity, in Essays on Industrial Organization in
Honor of Joe S. Bain 123, 141 (R. Masson & P. Qualls eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Weiss I] (high concentration often present when large proportion of output from
plants equals or exceeds minimum efficient scale); Report of the White House Task
Force on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 2 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 29 (1953-
1969). But see Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiencu vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 Am. Econ.
Rev. 392 (1966) (microeconomic theory inappropriately focuses on allocative effici-
ency when other types of efficiency are often more significant).
14. Economists define the long run as that period in which plant and equipment
are not fixed so that all inputs are variable. E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at 180. The
long run average total cost curve shows the minimum cost per unit of producing at
each output level. Connecting the minima for each short run average cost curve for
each size plant approximates the shape of the long run average total cost curve. Id.
at 180-82; P. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 469. Decreases in long run average total
cost are due to increasing returns to scale (for example, when a doubling of all inputs
leads to more than a doubling of output); increases are due to decreasing returns to
scale (for example, when a doubling of inputs leads to less than a doubling of output);
constant long run average total costs are due to constant returns to scale. Increasing
returns to scale result from the ability to use techniques not possible at smaller scale,
benefits of scale that accrue geometrically, and greater specialization. Decreasing re-
turns to scale are generally believed to result from the difficulties of coordinating a
large enterprise. E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at 142-43, 184-85; F. Scherer I. supra
note 4, at 82.
15. J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition 53 (1956); Schercr I, supra note 12, in
Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 17.
16. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 57; F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 104.
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confer real resource savings, resulting in an actual welfare benefit to
society. 7 "Strictly pecuniary" economies result in monetary savings
to a firm with market power but no overall welfare benefits to society
because they reflect no physical resource saving.'"
The achievement of real economies is a policy reason for incorpor-
ating scale economy concepts into antitrust law. 9 Specifically, be-
cause firms will remain viable in a competitive market only if they
minimize costs and operate at efficient scale,2" antitrust law should
reinforce competitive market structures to the extent that scale econ-
omies permit.' Without this reinforcement, resources may be
wasted and cost saving techniques may not be vigorously pursued.,
Scale economy concepts can be used to determine how antitrust
enforcement can promote both competition and operating efficiency
in markets in which the two goals conflict. Rational trade regulation
policy should encourage firms to achieve the efficiencies inherent in
operating at minimum optimal scale and avoid creating markets so
atomized that scale economies are lost. Economists generally agree
that scale economies determine what level of production is efficient,
as illustrated by the long run average total cost curve.,, Some econ-
omists argue that average total cost will eventually increase with size
(U-shaped curve), while others argue that once minimum optimal
scale is achieved, long run average cost is constant over a wide range
of output (L-shaped curve).Y Although greater flexibility in antitrust
17. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 57.
18. Id. A large firm may receive quantity discounts in advertising or on other
goods purchased, or may have reduced costs of capital. Although real economies, like
the ability to bypass intermediaries, may occur, the more pronounced result is
strictly pecuniary economies accruing to the firm because of its market power. Such
economies do not benefit society.
19. id.
20. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 1 402b2 ("Firms that fail to operate
at lowest cost may temporarily break even or even make modest profits when de-
mand is high, but will incur losses and eventually disappear as resources commanded
by more efficient firms move into the market."); E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at
265-66 (monopoly markets are scrutinized because they lack natural market forces).
21. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, t 408a.
22. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 403b, 403c.
23. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
24. E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at 185; F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 84-85;
Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in Industrial Concentration, supra note
12, at 1, 5-6. This disagreement as to the shape of the long run average total cost
curve can be graphically illustrated.
a. L-Shaped Curve b. U-Shaped Curve
Cost per Cost per
Unit 
Unit
Qa' Qa2 Total Quantity Qb' Total Quantity
Produced Produced
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enforcement may result if a market has an L-shaped cost curve, in
either case, scale economies would be destroyed by legal constraints
that force a firm to operate at less than minimum optimal scale.zl
Thus, scale economies constitute structural limitations on antitrust
enforcement because efficiencies are sacrificed when a firm operates
at less than minimum optimal scale.
Scale economy concepts also are useful to determine whether a
firm has market power. When minimum optimal scale constitutes a
large percentage of the market and unit costs rise significantly at less
than minimum optimal scale,26 scale economies constitute a barrier to
entry." Because a potential entrant will anticipate either higher
Figure (a) illustrates an L-shaped long run average total cost curve. If this is indeed
the shape of the curve, optimal scale would exist over a broad range of output levels.
For example, both output Q ' and Q.1 would be optimal. Figure (b) illustrates a
U-shaped curve. Only output level Qb is optimal if the curve is U-shaped. For a
discussion of how the shape of the curve determines whether a natural monopoly
exists, see note 72 infra and accompanying text.
25. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
26. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 53. Bain states that "'t]his fraction should be con-
sidered significant if its addition to going industry output (or the addition of a fraction
at which costs are not significantly higher) will result in a reduction of industry sell-
ing prices which is notable to established sellers in the sense of being distinguishable
from the effects of small random variations in market conditions, which is identifiable
as the result of the output increment in question, and which is large enough to be
felt." Id.
27. Record at 2332-36, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 17, 1969) (direct testimony of Frederick Scherer); Defendant's Exhibit 7643, at
33-34, id. (deposition of William Baumol); Defendant's Exhibit 7645, at 108, id.
(deposition of Sam Peltzman); Defendant's Exhibit 7648, at 47-48, id. (deposition of
George Stigler); Mancke Deposition Exhibit 8100-017, Nov. 20, 1980, at 767, id.
(analytical narrative of Richard Mancke, defendant's witness); J. Bain, supra note 15,
at 53-113. Conditions of entry are defined by Bain as "advantages of established
sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers, [evidenced by the ability of)
established sellers [to] persistently raise their prices above a competitive level with-
out attracting new firms to enter the industry." Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted); see G.
Stigler, The Organization of Industry 67 (1968) (a barrier to entry exists when insid-
ers have a long-run cost advantage over new entrants). Although barriers to entry
should be relevant in antitrust litigation as indicia of market power, courts primarily
rely on market share figures to gauge market power. See, e.g., United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 334
U.S. 270, 272 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458-62
(1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). See
generally Potential Production, supra note 9, at 1199 n.2. Courts considering entry
barriers have utilized a practical approach that evaluates whether a "real threat" of
entry exists. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1966) (Har-
lan, J., concurring). A "real threat" of entry exists only if experienced people in the
business conclude that the difficulties of entry are not insurmountable. Moveover, a
potential entrant must be able to enter easily and become a competitor in the market
within a reasonable time. See id. Barriers to entry have also been used to define the
relevant market. United States v. Pabst Brevving Co., 384 U.S. 546, 558-61 (1966)
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costs or lower prices when these high barriers to entry are present,
those already in the market possess significant market power."
(Harlan, J., concurring); see Potential Production, supra note 9, at 1211 n.70. Fi-
nally, raising entry barriers has been used as proof of anticompetitive conduct. United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 34345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
579 (1967); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810-11 (1946);
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 620 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425-26 (2d Cir. 19,15); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954);
United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 615 (N.D. Ohio 1942),
modified, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 409b, 409c;
L. Sullivan, supra note 9, § 23; Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 862 (1973); Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem:
Market Failure Considerations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1520 (1972). No distinction
will be made between the proof requirements for establishing scale economies as a
barrier to entry, or as a defense, under § 2 and § 7. Courts seem more likely,
however, to resolve ambiguities in favor of the defendant in § 2 cases and in favor of
the government in § 7 cases. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp.
333, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (courts more likely to invalidate an unconsummated merger
(§ 7) than to order divestiture of a company (§ 2)); J. Bain, supra note 15, at 54-55;
see Justice Department's Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures,
[1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 992, 4 (Spec. Supp. Dec. 4) (explic-
itly recognizing "high optimal scale of production" as a barrier to entry). But see
Fisher Deposition Exhibit 8101-001, Dec. 4, 1980, at 363, United States v. IBM
Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969) (Although static economies of
scale, as may occur in manufacturing, can provide barriers to entry, scale economies
in research and development generally cannot.); 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 2, 409b (because conforming with scale economies evidences competitive be-
havior, scale economies should not be used to show a barrier to entry); G. Stigler,
supra, at 67-70 (no barrier to entry is present if the established firm has the same
costs as the entering firm will have once it attains efficient scale). This Note expressly
adopts the views of Bain because Stigler and Areeda and Turner intermesh two dis-
tinct uses of scale economy concepts that are best kept analytically separate. Scale
economies can prove barriers to entry, a structural element, and evidence competi-
tive practices, a conduct element. See notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text.
Moreover, if Stigler's view were accepted, established firms could charge prices
above the competitive level over long periods before new entry could exert a com-
petitive force. Weiss Deposition Exhibit 8103-001, Feb. 1, 1981, at 29, United States
v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969) (analytical narrative of
Leonard Weiss, plaintiff's witness). Fisher argues that scale economies in research
and development cannot constitute entry barriers because technological innovations
by larger firms can be imitated by smaller firms. Thus, even if a firm would need a
significant share of the market to support large research and development facilities
efficiently, additional effective competitors could rely on innovation. This view is
faulty in suggesting that a firm that relies on its competitors for innovation could ever
be an effective competitor. Further, patent and trademark laws are designed to pro-
tect the fruits of innovation from competitors.
28. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 53-113; see note 27 supra.
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B. Measurement of Scale Economies
Although measurement of scale economies by empirical techniques
is difficult and imprecise,2 9 economists have developed various
measurement techniques. Because the validity of the measure de-
pends on the type of scale economy being considered, an understand-
ing of the various types of scale economies must precede discussion of
measurement techniques. For purposes of antitrust enforcement, it is
important to determine which measurement techniques best measure
real economies as opposed to strictly pecuniary economies.
Real economies usually relate directly to a production or distribu-
tion process, 30 and may be product-specific, plant-specific, or firm-
specific.3 ' Product-specific, plant-specific, and firm-specific econo-
mies focus on various types of business behavior. Product-specific
economies are associated with the volume of any single product made
and sold. Examples of product-specific real economies are savings in
machine running time, operator attendance time, and machine set-up
time that result from production of large quantities of a specific
product.32 A less quantifiable product-specific scale economy is the
experience and learning gained by management and workers after
producing a large volume of a specific product.Y Plant-specific real
economies are the decline of production and distribution unit costs as
29. Record at 2394-96, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 17, 1969) (direct testimony of Frederick Scherer); Fisher Deposition Ex-
hibit 8101-001, Dec. 4, 1980, at 378, id. (analytical narrative of Franklin Fisher,
defendant's witness); Mancke Deposition Exhibit 8100-017, Nov. 20, 1980, at 768, id.
(analytical narrative of Richard Mancke); Smith, Survey of the Empirical Evidence on
Economies of Scale, in Business Concentration and Price Policy 213, 215, 22,3 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Business Concentration]. Because output of plants and firms is
usually heterogeneous, measuring the size of economies of scale in empirical studies
is very difficult. Saving, Estimation of Optimum Size of Plant by the Survivor Tech-
nique, 75 Q.J. Econ. 569, 570-72, 597 (1961) (estimating optimum size is difficult
because plants produce various products at various rates with various degrees of ver-
tical integration, and it is difficult to define the relevant industry in which such
variety exists.).
30. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 104.
31. Id. at 81, 104; Asch, supra note 2, at 130-34; Dewey, supra note 24, in
Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 4-7; McGee, Efficiency and Economies of
Size, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 55, 58-61; Mueller, The New
Antitrust: A 'Structural' Approach, 1 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 87 (1967). Some
economists identify types of operating efficiency other than product-specific, plant-
specific, or firm-specific. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 105 C'Economics of scale, spe-
cialization of function, ability to obtain capital, management skill-all of these and
many more elements ... are causes ... of efficiency."); Leibenstein, supra note 13,
at 392 (motivation is the major element of operating efficiency).
32. See F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 81; McGee, supra note 31, at 57, 58.
33. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 82; Haldi & Whitcomb, Economies of Scale in
Industrial Plants, 75 J. Pol. Econ. 373, 383 (1975).
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plant capacity and production increase.- Costs decline partially be-
cause of the ability to specialize factors of production.- Examples of
real plant scale economies include lower unit costs in initial
investment,3 supervision and management, 37 maintenance,-" and en-
ergy consumption. 9 Firm-specific real economies are the decline in
production and distribution unit costs as firm size increases.4" Exam-
ples of firm scale economies include lower unit costs resulting from
specialization,' massed reserves, 2 and research and development.
The four techniques most commonly used by economists to mea-
sure scale economies and statistical cost studies, engineering studies,
profitability studies, and survivorship studies. 3 Statistical cost stud-
34. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 57; F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 82-83; McGee,
supra note 31, at 58.
35. L. Weiss, Economics and Society 28 (1975). Specialization permits real
economies in quantities of material and effort used to produce a unit of output. J.
Bain, supra note 15, at 57.
36. Haldi & Whitcomb, supra note 33, at 378-81, 383. Initial investment cost,
and consequently, the amortized portion of total cost, exhibits increasing returns to
scale, that is, declining unit costs as quantity increases, up to the largest plants
observed empirically. Id. at 383.
37. J. Johnston, Statistical Cost Analysis 23 (1960); Haldi & Whitcomb, supra
note 33, at 382-83; cf. Selection of Materials Submitted to the National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws & Procedures, 48 Antitrust L.J. 891, 894-95 (state-
ment of Robert Bork) (Efficient management is the most important type of produc-
tion efficiency because "[e]verything else follows from [it]: superior product design;
superior manufacturing techniques; superior labor performance; superior estimates of
consumer desires and market trends; superior distribution practices."). But see
National Commission Report, supra note 8, at 158 (whether managerial and financial
economies should be allowed as a defense is disputed). See generally F. Scherer, The
Economies of Multiplant Operation: An International Comparison Study (1975)
[hereinafter cited as F. Scherer II].
38. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 83; Haldi & Whitcomb, supra note 33, at 382.
39. Haldi & Whitcomb, supra note 33, at 381.
40. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 84.
41. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 84. Professor Scherer identifies the types of
specialization resulting from operation of the multiplant firm as both managerial
(accounting, finance, marketing, operations, research, and legal talent) and produc-
tion. The production specialization, however, actually results from plant scale econo-
mies, that is, more specialization can be achieved within individual plants for a given
product line. Id.
42. Id.; Baumol, The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic
Approach, 66 Q.J. Econ. 545, 547-49 (1952); cf. Brunner & Meltzer, Economies of
Scale in Cash Balances Reconsidered, 81 Q.J. Econ. 422, 423, 436 (1967) (cash bal-
ances economies of scale usually not present). Beneficial massed reserve economies
include large cash balances, more flexible production, market and finance risk of loss
spread over a large volume, and greater returns on marketing expenditures. F.
Scherer I, supra note 4, at 84.
43. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 92-94; Saving, supra note 29, at 572. Saving
identifies a fifth technique, the questionnaire method, in which business persons are
asked "which size of plant or firm is the optimum size in their industry." Id. This
method is open to criticism on grounds that the data may not be accurate at the time
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ies are useful for measuring real economies because they estimate
the cost of producing a commodity by breaking production into com-
ponent operations and assessing the cost of each operation." These
studies rely on cost accountants' data and employ standard statistical
techniques to estimate the long run average total cost for a cross sec-
tion of plant scales "I by comparing input statistics with output
statistics. '  Methodologies used and conclusions drawn from statisti-
cal cost studies, however, have been criticized because the cost data
are often unavailable, untimely, not comparable, and too simplistic.'
given or at some time in the future. Moreover, the technique requires accurate
capital cost data, which is rarely available. Id. Despite these deficiencies, this
method was used by the government to prove that scale economies constituted bar-
riers to entry in United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan.
17, 1969). See notes 114-17 infra and accompanying text.
44. J. Dean, Managerial Economics 296-313 (1951); J. Johnston, supra note 37, at
1; F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 93; A. Walters, An Introduction to Econometrics
269-339 (1970); McGee, supra note 31, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at
65-68; Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration [hereinafter cited as
Scherer II], in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 18; Smith, supra note 29,
at 213-38; Walters, Production and Cost Analysis, 12 Int'l Encyclopedia Soc. Sci-
ences 519, 521-23 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Waiters I]; Walters, Production and
Cost Functions: An Econometric Survey, 31 Econometrica 39, 52 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Walters II]. An ideal statistical cost study would evaluate short-run and
long-run cost-output relationships. J. Johnston, supra note 37, at 27. These ideals,
however, are rarely met. Id. at 26-29.
45. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 93. These studies usually estimate cost scale
relationships at the plant level. Id.
46. Id.; Scherer II, supra note 44, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at
18.
47. J. Blair, Economic Concentration 176 (1972) (unit cost data is fragmentary
and out of date); J. Johnston, supra note 37, at 2, 28-30, 169-94 (listing six criticisms
that relate to the short run average total cost function and three that relate to the
long run average total cost function); F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 93 (true cost
variations associated with scale differences may be misstated if there are systematic
differences in rent imputation between small plants and large); Stigler, supra note
12, at 55 (because cost data are influenced by productive services valuations. an over
or under valuation will under or overstate efficiency); Friedman, Comment. in Busi-
ness Concentration, supra note 29, at 230-31 (1955) (accounting cost studies only
measure "the efficiency of the capital market in revaluing assets."); McGee, supra
no2 31, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 66 (Because they rely on
accounting data used in routine business transactions, accounting cost studies are not
very useful, and "suffer from arbitrary asset valuations and a host of other technical
difficulties. Furthermore, quite different production programs (so far as different total
volumes, product types, etc.) are often being compared."); Saving, supra note 29, at
572; Scherer II, supra note 44, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 18
(Data often are unavailable and when available not comparable because of differences
in accounting conventions.); Smith, supra note 29, in Business Concentration, supra
note 29, at 216, 221 (comparisons of cost data are highly suspect because cost alloca-
tions vary according to the cost accounting techniques used by the finn); Walters II,
supra note 44, at 42-43 (1963) (accounting cost data are suspect because the unit
period for accounting purposes usually differs from the unit economic period, the
method of depreciation of assets is usually determined by the tax authorities, not
1981]
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As to particular markets, therefore, the validity of statistical tests and
techniques is doubtful.48
Real scale economies also can be measured with engineering cost
estimates, which utilize engineering techniques to measure the effi-
ciency of various technical processes.49 Engineering cost estimates
have the advantages of avoiding arbitrary asset valuations by ac-
countants and evaluating each relevant dimension of production."
Disadvantages, however, include failure to account for managerial
and entrepreneurial ability51 and unrealistic economic assumptions. 2
Moreover, the estimates are often not easily translatable into terms
useful to economists.-
Profitability studies are generally used to estimate scale economies
for the firm as a whole." These estimates do not distinguish between
real and strictly pecuniary economies because profitability figures are
not designed to provide such detailed information. Although profita-
bility data is usually available, profits may result from a variety of
causes other than efficiency.' Moreover, profit figures may not ade-
economists, the valuation of capital services is at historical cost rather than current
prices, and stock valuation is often somewhat arbitrary). See generally Harberger,
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 77 (1954).
48. J. Johnston, supra note 37, at 2; McGee, supra note 31, in Industrial Con-
centration, supra note 12, at 67.
49. J. Bain, supra note 15, at 71-83, 227-49; B. Boylan, Economic Effects of
Scale Increases in the Steel Industry (1975); F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 94; F.
Scherer II, supra note 37, at 182-83; Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and
the Conditions of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 35
(1954); Chenery, Engineering Production Functions, 63 Q.J. Econ. 507, 508-10
(1949); Smith, supra note 29, in Business Concentration, supra note 29, at 221;
Weiss I, supra note 13, at 132-33. Management decisions regarding the desirability
of alternate equipment and plant design are often based upon such studies. See
sources cited supra.
50. McGee, supra note 31, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 69.
51. Id. Engineering studies include assumptions as to ideal or average managerial
ability. Id. Other areas not covered by engineering studies include recruitment,
evaluation, promotion, product design, research, planning, administration, cost and
quality control, finance, and marketing. Id.
52. See Saving, supra note 29, at 572. Engineering cost studies assume that
supply and demand for the product are also completely elastic. Id.
53. Walters II, supra note 44, at 43. The results of engineering studies separate
processes that may be inseparable. Id.
54. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 92.
55. Id.
56. J. Blair, supra note 47, at 177 (profits may also reflect monopoly power, not
solely efficiency); F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 92 (same); McGee, supra note 31, in
Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 83-88 (accounting profits not necessarily
economic profits). Even if profits measure efficiency, profit rates for small firms are
usually understated because profits are not broken down as to each product, and
older equipment is undervalued. J. Blair, supra note 47, at 177-78.
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quately reflect true profits because of various accounting conventions
governing depreciation and asset valuation.5-
Equally ambiguous results are achieved with the survivorship tech-
nique, which infers optimal scale from observations of which size firm
survives.-" Firms are classified according to size, and if the market
share of a given size-class increases, that size is assumed to be rel-
atively more efficient.5 As with profitability studies, no distinction is
made between real and strictly pecuniary scale economies. Many econ-
omists, however, doubt the reliability of the survivorship technique
because survival may result from causes other than greater efficiency,
such as exercise of monopoly power, collusion, or undesirable labor
practices.'
57. McGee, supra note 31, in Industrial Concentration, supra note 12, at 84
(corporate profits fail to account for efficiency benefits accruing to the consumer).
The statistical cost study method shares these faults. See note 47 supra and accom-
panying text.
58. Saving, supra note 29, at 572-73 (1961). The survivorship technique %vas in-
itially used in 1924 by Willard L. Thorp in a census monograph to demonstrate a
"trend in the size of plant under different patterns of industry growth." Id. at 573;
see Stigler, supra note 12, at 54-55, 61-67.
59. Saving, supra note 29, at 574-83; Stigler, supra note 12, at 56; Weiss, The
Survival Technique and the Extent of Suboptimal Capacity, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 246,
246 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Weiss II]. The survivorship technique estimates
optimal plant size by comparing successive discrete size distributions, Markov
Chains, and continuous size distributions. Saving, supra note 29, at 574 & n.9.
60. See generally F. Scherer I, supra note 4, 92-93 (The reliability of the survi-
vorship technique depends on how reasonable it is to suppose that the optimum
scale or distribution has itself remained unchanged and the emergence of new mis-
takes has been less important than the correction of old ones. These assumptions
should not be taken for granted.); Saving, supra note 29, at 597 (W~hen monopolistic
industries are treated on an equal basis with competitive industries, the estimated
optimum size may become a size that has considerably higher social costs than some
nonoptimal size.); Stigler, supra note 12, at 62-63 (size and other factors are ariable
not static); Weiss II, supra note 59, at 246. "Large firms may survive and grow by
means of predatory or restrictive policies or because of their ability to exploit sup-
pliers. They may decline, relatively, because their market positions force them to
hold an umbrella over the firms in the competitive fringe of the industry or because
they feel a threat of dismemberment at the hands of the antitrust authorities. Small
firms may survive and grow because of their ability to exploit monopsonistic positions
in local labor markets or to circumvent the law. The survival technique makes no
distinction between these advantages and those attributable to low social costs." Id.
at 246. Professor Weiss gives the additional example that suboptimal smaller firms
could survive in an oligopolistic market in which price is set above minimum average
cost. The smaller firms would have an incentive to replace plants with suboptimal
capacity with plants of optimal scale, but this would not be essential to their survival.
Id. at 253. But see Weiss II, supra note 59, at 260 (Investigation of five industries
using tabulations of all plant sizes reported in directories led to the conclusion that
the estimates of minimum efficient scale derived from the survivorship technique were
consistent with engineering estimates. In view of the limited nature of this study,
however, it did not prove the validity of the survivorship technique.).
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The characteristics of these techniques lead to various conclusions
about their adaptability to antitrust analysis. Statistical cost studies
and engineering studies should be preferred for antitrust purposes
because they are more precise, likely to be available because they are
made in the regular course of business, and more appropriate for
measuring real scale economies. 6' Profitability studies and survi-
vorship studies are less precise and, therefore, may be less appropri-
ate for use in antitrust litigation.6"
II. CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS
Adapting economic theory to a legal context is problematic for
several reasons. Economists do not universally agree on economic
theory regarding efficiencies. Measurement techniques, developed
for purposes of empirical research, process complex economic data
and may not be of practical use as legal evidence.6 Nevertheless,
economic theory concerning scale economies can and should be ap-
plied to several antitrust issues. First, plaintiff can prove that scale
economies constitute a barrier to entry by a showing of the magni-
tude of minimum optimal scale and the percentage of the market
required to achieve that scale. 3 Second, the effect that scale econo-
mies have on market structure can be used to infer the intent behind
certain commercial conduct. For example, a capacity expansion that
forecloses a competitor from growth or entry is not predatory if con-
sistent with scale economies.' Third, the effect that scale economies
have on market structure can be considered along with other struc-
tural factors to determine the competitive effect that a contemplated
action has on a market. For example, scale economy concepts can be
used to justify a merger when the scale economies that result from
the merger outweigh any anticompetitive structural effects.67 Fur-
ther, the defendant can prove that divestiture is an inappropriate
remedy when it would force operation at less than minimum optimal
scale.6 '
Courts, however, do not always use analysis of scale economies
when it is appropriate. Scale economy issues are often not
recognized.69 Even when recognized, the economic concepts often
61. See notes 44-53 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972) (scale
economies not addressed in analyzing erection of barriers to entry resulting from
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cause confusion when courts attempt to apply them to specific fact
patterns.' Finally, even after courts have correctly identified and
analyzed such issues, they have failed clearly to delineate standards of
proof.7' As a result of this confusion, reconciliation of the cases with
economic principles is difficult. Nevertheless, adapting scale economy
concepts to a legal framework is worthwhile and legally justified.
A. Natural Monopoly Cases
The importance of scale economy concepts is most obvious in mar-
kets in which the minimum optimal scale is equal to or greater than
demand. Economists and judges refer to these markets as natural
monopolies.7 2 That possession of natural monopoly power should not
acquisition); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-09 (1948) (scale economies
not addressed in determining legality of master agreements in distribution of films to
theatres); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 42.5-26 (2d Cir.
1945) (scale economies not addressed in determining legality of plant capacity expan-
sions).
70. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1967) (adver-
tising economies resulting from merger identified but held that economies are no
defense); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962) (efficiencies
of integration resulting from merger are no defense under § 7 and are an affirmative
reason for holding the merger unlawful); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (integration efficiency argument accepted in defense
of leveraging act when the two were unrelated), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
But see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (analysis of economies is crucial to deciding case). Professor Bork has noted that
"[m]odern antitrust [law's] ... version of economics is a m6lange of valid insights
and obviously incorrect-sometimes fantastic-assumptions about the motivations
and effects of business behavior .... [Plerhaps the core of the difficulty is that the
courts... have failed to understand and give proper weight to the crucial concept of
business efficiency .... [T]his failure has skewed legal doctrine disastrously." R.
Bork, supra note 2, at 7. See generally Turner, supra note 5, at 1328-30.
71. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 987, F-1, F-10 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 1980) (simple tests inadequate; must
proceed on a case-by-case basis, using a balancing approach that allows for rational,
efficiency related conduct).
72. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973); Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956
(1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397 (4th
Cir. 1974); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582,
584 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v.
Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 514-15 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001
(1972); American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 130-31
(4th Cir. 1963); Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., (1980-2] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,526, at 76,803 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
295 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); C. Kaysen & D. Turner, supra note 3, at
191 (natural monopoly is a "monopoly resulting from economies of scale, a rela-
tionship between the size of the market and the size of the most efficient firm such
that one firm of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can take at a
remunerative price, and can continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a
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give rise to liability under section 2 was first suggested in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America.' Judge Hand in Alcoa argued
that possession of monopoly power without intent to end or prevent
competition gave rise to a "thrust upon" defense. 4 One example of
this defense given by Judge Hand was when the market is "so limited
that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production
except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand.""'
Although ambiguous, this language has been used by courts to hold
that the "thrust upon" defense does indeed cover a natural monopoly
situation. 6
Courts have only superficially discussed proof of the existence of
natural monopoly power. Instead of relying on economic studies to
prove that the minimum efficient scale will supply all the demand,"
courts readily accept the existence of natural monopolies in certain
industries such as daily newspapers in small towns,"8 professional
new firm entering the business"); E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at 267 ("a firm may
become a monopolist because the average cost of producing the product reaches a
minimum at an output rate that is big enough to satisfy the entire market at a price
that is profitable"); F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 91, 482 (A natural monopoly mar-
ket, one in which there is room for only one firm, results from the relevant technol-
ogy and the size of the market, that is, the level of demand at which price equals
minimum unit cost.). The extent to which a natural monopoly market sets parameters
for antitrust enforcement depends upon the shape of the long run average total cost
curve. See note 24 supra and accompanying text (economists disagree on the shape of
the long run average total cost curve).
73. 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 430.
76. E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 4L0 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397
(4th Cir. 1974); American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d
124, 131 (4th Cir. 1963); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284
F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Massena v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,526, at 76,802 (N.D.N.Y.
1980); Homefinders of Am., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 471 F. Supp. 416, 425
(D.R.I. 1979), affd, 621 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1980); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
77. For a discussion of the relevant measures of efficient scale, see notes 43-60
supra and accompanying text.
78. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584
(1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); United States v. Harte-Hanks
Newspapers, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227, 228 (N.D. Tex. 1959); see Homefinders of Am.,
Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 471 F. Supp. 416, 425 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d
441 (1st Cir. 1980); Note, Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 Yale L.J.
948, 1005 (1952). But see Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496
F.2d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (required evidence that the market could not accom-
modate two newspapers). Courts finding natural monopolies have assumed that a
certain quality of news and advertising is demanded by the public. See Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d at 584 & n.4; United States v.
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sports teams,- utilities,' and some contractual relationships with the
government.81 Although never expressly analyzing cost factors that
would evidence a natural monopoly, courts infer a natural monopoly
when evidence has proven the existence of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, such as restrictive covenants,' exclusive franchises,83 exclusive
contracts, ' or essential facilities.'s Such a conclusion is unwarranted
without further examination of the underlying economic evidence.
These cases are useful, however, for analyzing the bounds of accept-
able behavior for a natural monopolist.
Once a market is termed a natural monopoly, lawful acquisition of
monopoly power is virtually assumed.' Aggressive competition is
Harte-Hanks Newspapers Inc., 170 F. Supp. at 228. One court mentioned produc-
tion scale economies as a factor relevant to the existence of a natural monopoly, but
did not analyze such economies. Id.
79. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); American Football League v. National Football League,
323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 505-13 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (use of
reserve clause to restrain free movement of players from one team to another pre-
vented another league from entering the market and constituted a § 2 violation). In
American Football League, the district court apparently relied upon the informal
opinion of an industry executive that a city could not support more than one team.
American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60, 70 (D.
Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
80. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) (each town
in service area could accommodate only one distribution system); Town of Massena
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,526, at 76,802
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (transmission lines were a bottleneck); City of Mishawaka v. Amer-
ican Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (no reasonable
substitute source of power available), affd in part and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 79-2059).
81. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). In Ovitron, the government was the sole buyer of the product at issue. The
low bidder for the production contract supplied the whole demand. The court men-
tioned that tooling for a large quantity of the product in satisfaction of the contract
takes as much as one year. Unfortunately, there was no further analysis of production
scale economies. Id. at 377 n.2.
82. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
83. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973). Exclusive
franchises have been expressly recognized as promoting distribution efficiencies.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977).
84. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 376-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
85. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). In Hecht, the court applied the "essential facility" doc-
trine or "bottleneck principle," finding that a restrictive covenant in the defendant
team's lease of the stadium, the only stadium in the relevant geographic market
suitable for the exhibition of professional football games, mandated finding a natural
monopoly. See id.
86. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369, 377 (1973);
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 990, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
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tolerated; the winner in a fight for survival is not condemned for
having won.' Acquisition of a natural monopoly market, however, is
lawful only if specific exclusionary practices, such as predatory pric-
ing," group boycotting, 89 below cost bidding,1° and price squeezing,9'
were not used. Such practices might defeat the presumption of legal-
ity and give rise to liability.
Maintaining a natural monopoly also is presumed legal. The natural
monopolist may defend against potential competitors and use the
benefits of the natural monopoly to enter new markets through ver-
tical integration or horizontal expansion,3 even when extending into
other natural monopoly markets. 94 As with acquisition, however,
maintenance of a natural monopoly cannot be accomplished by means
such as leveraging,' price squeezing,' and bottlenecking.9Y
436 U.S. 956 (1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d
391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506,
515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972); John Wright & Assocs. v. Ullrich,
328 F.2d 474, 480-81 (8th Cir. 1964); American Football League v. National Football
League, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 1963); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of
New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945); Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,526, at 76,803 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Ovi-
tron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United
States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
87. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1948).
88. Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397-98 (4th
Cir. 1974).
89. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584-85
(1st Cir. 1960).
90. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
91. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1332
(N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 79-2059).
92. American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 131
(4th Cir. 1963).
93. Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., [1980-2) Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,526, at 76,804, 76,821 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
94. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584
(1st Cir. 1960).
95. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973).
96. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1332
(N.D. Ind. 1979) (illegal use of power supply to attain local dominance), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3494
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 79-2059); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (illegally restraining use of scarce facility), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978).
97. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973); Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal
Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976).
[Vol. 49
1981] ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN ANTITRUST LAW 789
Scale economies inherent in a natural monopoly also receive defer-
ence when a court is determining appropriate relief after a natural
monopolist has violated the antitrust laws.' Divestiture is generally
not appropriate.' Illegal predatory practices are remedied by injunc-
tion or regulation,"° presumably because it is in the public interest to
preserve the scale economies achieved by the natural monopolist.'
B. Extension of the Natural Monopoly Cases
When scale economies play the central role in a market, as in the
natural monopoly cases, courts have limited antitrust scrutiny and
preserved the efficiency inherent in large scale economies. The logic
of this deference can and should be extended to markets in which
scale economies play an important, though less central, role ' - be-
cause economies of scale generally exist for any production process
and to that extent will control the structure of a market.I, Serious
practical problems, however, may arise in gauging the extent to
which scale economies control a market 10 when scale economies are
significant, but do not give rise to a natural monopoly. Strong and
convincing evidence of the existence of scale economies is not likely
to be present. 5 Courts would be forced to measure scale economies
98. Cf. notes 129-36 infra and accompanying text (deference to scale economies
when determining relief under § 2).
99. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945)
("Dissolution is not a penalty but a remedy; if the industry will not need it for its
protection, it will be a disservice to break up an aggregation which has for so long
demonstrated its efficiency."). Divestiture of a natural monopoly would, by defini-
tion, destroy scale economies. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
100. E. Mansfield, supra note 1, at 267, 292-94 (the public often insists on gov-
ernment regulation when a merger creates a natural monopoly), F. Scherer 1. supra
note 4, at 482 ("[t]he most traditional economic case for regulation assumes the exis-
tence of natural monopoly"). Scherer lists three hypotheses explaining why regulation
is necessary in the natural monopoly situation: to protect consumers from the inher-
ent monopoly power, to promote political objectives, or to protect vested interests.
Id. at 483. This Note does not address regulated industries because they are largely
outside the scope of the antitrust laws, and because the legal and economic interrela-
tions between regulation and competition are complex. C. Kaysen & D. Turner.
supra note 3, at 4.
101. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
102. Courts should respect the economic theory underlying the antitrust laws
when deciding any antitrust case, see note 9 supra and accompanying text, as courts
have when dealing with natural monopoly markets. See notes 72-100 supra and
accompanying text.
103. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 1, 408; F. Scherer I, supra note 4. at
81.
104. For a discussion of problems with economists* techniques for measuring scale
economies, see notes 27-48 supra and accompanying text.
105. Courts faced with natural monopoly cases have circumvented proof problems
by using strong and concrete circumstantial evidence. Courts have concluded that
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under section 2 by relying on difficult to obtain direct economic
evidence '0 such as engineering studies" and opinion testimony of
industry executives." Nevertheless, because of the clear economic
effect of scale economies, courts should strive to overcome these
practical problems by more systematically measuring scale economies
and incorporating them in analysis of liability and relief.'
1. Section 2
Once proven, scale economies are relevant to three market
structure "n and conduct 1 ' issues under section 2. First, when scale
a natural monopoly market exists without determininmg minimum efficient scale. See
notes 77-85 supra and accompanying text. Circumstantial evidence of lesser scale
economies, if available at all, is not likely to be clear and convincing.
106. See notes 48, 55, 58-59, 62 supra and accompanying text.
107. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA),
No. 987, F-1, F-2 (F.T.C. Oct 20, 1980).
108. United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969).
109. Fisher Deposition Exhibit 8101-001, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69
Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969) (analytical narrative of Franklin Fisher),
Dec. 4, 1980, at 372-85 (scale economies cannot be determined with only vague
statements of industry witnesses about the magnitude of minimum efficient scale);
Mancke Deposition Exhibit 8100-017 (analytical narrative of Richard Mancke), Nov.
20, 1980, at 770, id. (testimony of industry witnesses relied on by government ex-
perts does not support their estimates of minimum efficient scale). These practical
problems can be substantially overcome by using various measurement techniques to
determine minimum efficient scale. See notes 29-62 supra and accompanying text.
110. The structural component of the actual monopolization offense under § 2 is
that the defendant possesses monopoly power, that is, " 'the power to control prices
or exclude competition.' " United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)
(quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
This can be proven by showing power to raise price above the competitive level,
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); American Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 402-09 (1921), control over an over-
whelming share of the relevant market, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 567 (1966); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 339
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (19:54); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1948); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
527-28 (1948), or over a substantial share of the market in conjunction with market
structure, conduct, and performance. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956). See generally 16 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws
and Trade Regulation § 8.02[31 (1980). The structural component of the attempted
monopolization offense under § 2 is a "dangerous probability" of monopoly, that is,
the defendant has sufficient power to create a monopoly and has committed overt
acts in furtherance of that goal. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175, 177 (1965); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785
(1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally 16 J. von
Kalinowski, supra, § 8,02[3].
111. The conduct component of the actual monopolization offense under § 2 is the
wilful acquisition or maintenance of market power, or the use of such power to fore-
close competition or gain a competitive advantage. United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
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economies constitute a barrier to entry, they may supplement tradi-
tional market share analysis to show that market power exists. u2 One
discussion of scale economies constituting an entry barrier is in Un-
ited States v. International Business Machines Corp."13 The govern-
ment's economic witnesses have testified that IBM's market power is
protected by a scale economy barrier that requires an entrant to
achieve a 5% to 15% market share before it can operate at minimum
efficient scale."" According to government testimony, the entry bar-
384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). This
is often stated as a general intent requirement, that is, the "purpose or intent to
exercise that power" for anticompetitive purposes. Id.; American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811, 814 (1946). General intent may be inferred
when the monopolist has used predatory tactics to attain the monopoly position,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571, 576 (1966); Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1945), or when the monopoly was legally ac-
quired but illegally maintained or expanded. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100
(1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-42 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally 16 J. von Kali-
nowski, supra note 110, § 8.02[4]. The conduct component of the attempted monop-
olization offense is used to prove a specific intent to monopolize. Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626-27 (1953); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149-51 (1951); United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
814-15 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 987, F-I, F-5
(F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980); L. Sullivan, supra note 9, § 51, at 135. Specific intent is an
elusive concept. See generally Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize- Specific Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1121 (1973). It has been de-
fined as "the intent to indulge in means that are in some sense untoward." Cooper,
Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic
Riddle of Section Two, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 395 (1974) (footnote omitted). Specific
intent may be inferred from somewhat unfair conduct. Transamerica Computer Co.
v. IBM Corp., 459 F. Supp. 626, 632-33 (N.D. Cal.), aff d, 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.
1978).
112. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text. The natural monopoly situation
is the extreme example of scale economies as a barrier to entry. Any potential en-
trant recognizing that the market can support only one firm would be deterred from
entering. Fisher Deposition Exhibit 8101-001, Dec. 4, 1980, at 364-70, United States
v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969) (analytical narrative of
Franklin Fisher).
113. No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969).
114. Record at 69719-24, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 1969) (direct testimony of Leonard Weiss, March 16, 1978). Weiss
relied on an estimate of minimum efficient scale for "Electric Capital Goods" made
by C.F. Pratten, and testimony of witnesses from Univac, Xerox, General Electric,
Record at 7095-86, id. (testimony of Ulric Weil); Plaintiff's Exhibit 320, at 26, id.
(General Electric estimated that 10 to 15 percent of the general purpose market w,,as
required to have some stability in its product offering and its ability to serve custom-
ers), and RCA. Record at 13081-82, id., (testimony of Vernon Wright) (RCA deter-
mined a 10% share of the general purpose market v'as necessary to provide and
sustain a broad development program). No industry executives based their estimates
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rier resulting from minimum efficient scale of this size is very high,
substantially delaying entry and enhancing IBM's market power."7
IBM argues that scale economies are not a barrier to entry because
firms have entered and operated successfully at less than 5% to 15%
of the market. 1 6 The government's legal argument that significant
scale economies constitute a barrier to entry that evidences market
power is consistent with at least some well accepted economic
theory. 1
17
The legality of acquiring and maintaining market power also can be
analyzed using scale economy concepts. Although stronger evidence
may be required to prove the specific intent element of attempted
monopolization than the general intent element of actual
monopolization,"' a defense based on scale economies is similar for
either offense."19 For example, scale economies can justify capacity
expansions that exclude competition from profitable growth
opportunities. 20 Although United States v. Aluminum Co. of
upon studies of the shape of the firm's long run average total cost curve. Weiss
concluded, very tentatively, that this information indicated that a 5% to 15% share of
the market would be needed to be efficient in the relevant market. Record at 69725,
id. (direct testimony of Leonard Weiss, March 16, 1978); Record at 53560-61, id.
(direct testimony of Alan McAdams). McAdams testified that among the major bar-
riers to entry to the relevant market was the scale of operations required to achieve
efficiency, which he estimated to be at least 10% of the market. Record at 53560-61,
id.
115. Record at 69728, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 1969) (direct testimony of Leonard Weiss, March 16, 1978). This mini-
mum efficient scale for the relevant market was comparable to Bain's estimates of
minimum efficient scale for five industries thought to have high scale economies
barriers. Id.
116. Mancke Deposition Exhibit 8100-017, Nov. 20, 1980, at 771-72, United
States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969) (analytical
narrative of Richard Mancke, Defendant's witness).
117. Record at 69726-29, United States v. IBM Corp., 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 1969) (based upon economic framework of scale economy barriers in
J. Bain, supra note 15, at 53-113).
118. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 987, F-1 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980); note 114 supra and accompanying text.
119. Compare E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA), No. 987, F-1, F-11 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980) (scale economies balanced
against anticompetitive effects in an attempted monopolization case) with United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (thrust upon
defense allows consideration of structural market forces in an actual monopolization
case).
120. A preemptive capacity expansion is an effective anticipation of increases in
demand and forestallment of all competition. This can be accomplished by progres-
sively embracing each new opportunity as it opens and facing each newcomer with
new capacity, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430-31 (2d Cir.
1945), or by building excess capacity or planning to fulfill foreseen demand with new
and expanded plants of greater size than needed for minimum optimal scale. See E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 987,
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America"' held that a monopolist's maintenance of market share
through repeated capacity expansions, though reasonably responsive
to anticipated demand, was exclusionary conduct that constituted an
abuse of monopoly power,' 22 the court did not consider whether
Alcoa's expansions were consistent with scale economies. No subse-
quent case has addressed a scale economies defense to a charge that a
capacity expansion was preemptory within the context of actual mo-
nopolization. Scale economies have, however, been accepted as a de-
fense to the specific intent element of the attempted monopolization
offense. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently upheld an
expansion strategy that was wholly responsive to projected demand
increases and consistent with plant scale economies against an allega-
tion that the expansion was primarily intended to preempt competi-
tors' expansion plans.'2 The FTC held that the defendant should be
permitted to expand capacity in increments of at least minimum effi-
cient scale, even if the result was to preempt competition.' 4
Scale economies also have been used to justify allegedly predatory
behavior, other than preemptive capacity expansions, in actual mo-
nopolization cases. For example, a dealer reduction program is not
predatory if justified by scale economies in which the manufacturer's
unit cost of marketing his product is less when fewer dealers are
trained. L'2 Moreover, manufacturers can collectively switch distribu-
F-i, F-2 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980); cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 526 (1948) (no per se rule against expansion of facilities to meet new demand).
121. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
122. Id. at 430-31.
123. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 987, F-1, F-7 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980). This case was brought under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The FTC, however,
explicitly stated that analysis of the case would follow § 2 theory. (1980] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at F-5. Specifically, complaint counsel charged that the ex-
pansion was premature and that announcements concerning expansion intentions
were exaggerated primarily to preempt competitors' expansion. Id. at F-2; cf. Hiland
Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968) (internal capacity expansion
that would allow defendant to supply more than 20% of demand, without more, did
not constitute an attempt), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
124. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA),
No. 987, F-i, F-11 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1980). The rationale for this decision was that
the defendant, having achieved technological success, should not be denied the
opportunity to compete for all the reasonably projected increase in demand. Id.
125. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712-13 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). The reasoning is that a legitimate
business purpose, such as the preservation of scale economies, is a sufficient defense
to the general intent element of the offense. See 16 J. von Kalinowski, supra note
110, § 8.02[4] n.146 (the maintenance of monopoly power is unlawful only if it is
accomplished by policies intended to limit or prevent the entry of new competitors
or to exclude present competitors). It is fruitful to recall that in the natural monopoly
situation, acts that result in exclusion of competitors are not necessarily condemned.
See notes 87-97 supra and accompanying text.
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tors with impunity if motivated solely by a desire to maintain econo-
mies of scale."" The existence of scale economies, however, does not
constitute a complete defense to other predatory practices.'," For
example, monopoly power resulting from scale economies, whether
pecuniary or real, cannot be leveraged from one market into
another. '"
Finally, scale economy concepts can be used to determine
appropriate relief under section 2. The remedial goal of eliminating
illegal market power'2 9 must be balanced against any public injury
resulting from a loss in economies."3 Thus, divestiture is proper only
126. Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metro Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 539 F.2d 907, 912-13
(2d Cir. 1976); see Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289,
292-94 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
127. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam. 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
128. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509
(1969) (scale economies achieved in one market cannot be used to exert economic
power over other products that company produces). Compare United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (Although large scale buying is not per se unlawful
because it may yield price or other lawful advantages to the buyer, monopoly power
gained through large scale buying may not be leveraged into another market.) with
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(strictly pecuniary economies may not support a defense). But see Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (integrated business does
not offend Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association
with a division possessing a monopoly in its own market), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980).
129. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 252 (1968). Other
goals include terminating any illegal combinations and depriving the defendants of
any of the benefits of the illegal conduct. Id.; United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp.
333, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
130. Scherer, Structure-Performance Relationships and Antitrust Policy
[hereinafter cited as Scherer III], in Industrial Concentration and the Market System
128 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Concentration and the
Market]; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
Am. Econ. Rev. 18, 18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Williamson II]. This balancing is a
tradeoff between social welfare benefits resulting from achieving scale economics and
social welfare losses resulting from allocative inefficiencies caused by increased mar-
ket power. Id. at 18-19, 23, 32. Through a partial equilibrium analysis, Williamson
concludes that a merger that yields non-trivial real economies must produce substan-
tial market power and result in relatively large price increases for the net allocative
effects to be negative. Id. at 23. Similarly, a divestiture that destroys non-trivial real
economies must divest substantial market power and result in relatively large price
reductions for the net allocative effects to be positive. Id.; see Fox, Economic Con-
centration, Efficiencies and Competition: Social Goals and Political Choices, in Con-
centration and the Market, supra, at 137. The more market power a firm has, the
less likely it is to maximize potential scale economies or lower price. Id. at 141. A
court considering relief also will usually consider whether relief is necessary to re-
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when scale economies are not seriously impaired."' Although stan-
dards used by courts to determine the appropriateness of divestiture as
a remedy in a section 2 case are not clear,"' courts have been reluc-
tant to grant divestiture, i probably because they are unable to deter-
mine clearly its likely net effects.'3 Economists also are apparently
unable to determine clearly the effects of divestiture. Although recent
economic studies have indicated that scale economies mandate high
degrees of concentration, 'm other studies show that many industries
store competition in the monopolized market and whether a less restrictive alternative
to divestiture, such as an injunction, is appropriate. See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); L. Sullivan, supra note 9, § 54, at
142-43; Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191, 1196, 1199 (1977).
131. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). A trend away from the "conduct"
approach, addressing specific bad acts of the monopolist with injunctions, and to-
wards a "structural" approach, restructuring the industry to encourage competition,
is apparent in the post World War II era. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 75-77 (1911) (conduct approach) with United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-31 (2d Cir. 1945) (structural approach) and United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1953)
(same), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
133. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
134. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347-48 (D.
Mass. 1953) (reluctance to order dissolution is caused in part by lack of expertise in
economic theories upon which structural relief is based), affd per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954); see L. Sullivan, supra note 9, §§ 53, 55, at 141, 145; Williamson II,
supra note 130, at 19. In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski was unwilling to grant divesti-
ture when it appeared impossible to create three independent, integrated firms. In
particular, the operation had one plant, one set of jigs and tools, one foundry, and
one laboratory. 110 F. Supp. at 348. Commentators have criticized United Shoe for
its failure to recognize the flexibility of American business to respond to changed
conditions. See Baldwin, The Feedback Effect of Business Conduct on Industry
Structure, 12 J.L. & Econ. 123, 128 (1969); Dewey, Romance and Realism in Anti-
trust, 63 J. Pol. Econ. 93, 93-101 (1955). Because courts lack a basis for evaluating
net effects of a merger, they often are predisposed to disallow it. See Williamson II,
supra note 130, at 19. This predisposition flows from a reluctance to sacrifice long-
term competitive consequences to short-term efficiency gains. Id. Courts, however,
are not predisposed toward granting structural relief in § 2 cases. When the net
effects are in doubt, it seems that courts are more willing to maintain the status quo
than order divestiture after measuring the tradeoff between long-term anticompeti-
tive consequences and short-term efficiency gains. Courts arguably do not possess
the expertise to conduct this type of tradeoff analysis, but it can and should be
performed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department or the FTC. Id. at
34; see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347-48 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
135. Lohr, Antitrust: Big Business Breathes Easier, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, §
3, at 1, col. 2.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
could be considerably fragmented without seriously sacrificing scale
economies. 136 Thus, divestiture should be granted only when solid
economic evidence showing that scale economies would not be de-
stroyed has been introduced.
2. Section 7
Scale economies are relevant within the context of section 7137 to
assess the probable competitive effects of a merger.' 38  Liability
under section 7, which is intended to arrest the undue concentration
of economic power in its incipiency, arises when the merger may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.'19 Fac-
tors used by courts to determine the probable anticompetitive effects
of a merger include concentration in the industry 4' and the possibil-
ity of increased barriers to entry. "' Generally, courts will consider
all economic and statistical data relevant to a determination of the
prQbable impact of the merger,1 2 including resulting scale economies
that create a barrier to entry or that have a procompetitive effect.
Although, as an economic matter, monopolies and mergers give
rise to the same scale economy issues,"4 the framework of section 7
136. F. Scherer II, s-upra note 37, at 393-96; Scherer III, supra note 130, at 133.
137. For the text of § 7, see note 11 supra.
138. Turner, supra note 5. In this seminal article on conglomerate mergers, Pro-
fessor Turner notes that varying degrees of pro and anticompetitive consequences
result from the various types of mergers, id. at 1317-22, and argues that if anticom-
petitive effects predominate, the merger should be discouraged. Id. at 1320. When
beneficial effects such as the promotion of scale economies predominate, however,
and such effects are unlikely to be realized in the absence of the merger, the merger
should be encouraged. Id. at 1318. When the potential anticompetitive effects of a
merger are great, but substantial scale economies are also likely to result, the possi-
bility of achieving economies through internal growth should be considered. Id. at
1320-21.
139. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) ("may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or tend to create a monopoly" (emphasis added)).
140. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); United States v,
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-67 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
334-46 (1962).
141. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); Emhart Corp. v.
USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 180-82 (1st Cir. 1975).
142. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (economies, including advertising economies, may be used to defend a
merger); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962) (merger that
would foreclose substantial share of market "without producing any countervailing
competitive, economic, or social advantages" violates § 7). But see FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (majority opinion) (possible economics cannot
be used as a defense to illegality); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 371 (1963) (an otherwise violative merger is not saved by evidence that it is
beneficial "on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits").
143. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962) and
95 Cong. Rec. 11484-507 (1949) (House debates on H.R. 2734, a bill to amend the
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creates more formidable analytical problems." First, section 7 man-
dates scrutiny of probable, not actual, economic effects."4 Moreover,
section 7 case law defines three general categories of mergers,
horizontal,"4 vertical, 47 and conglomerate,14 from which the kinds of
scale economies likely to result are quite different."'  The result is
that section 7 law on scale economies is confused and ambiguous.'t 0
Nevertheless evidence of scale economies can and should be used
in several ways in the context of a section 7 case. First, scale econo-
mies can be used to assess the competitive environment in which a
merger occurs. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,' the Supreme
Court held that analysis of the "structure, history, and probable fu-
ture" of the market would provide the setting to judge the likely
anticompetitive effects of the merger." In a market in which scale
economy barriers exist, that is, when minimum efficient scale consti-
tutes a significant share of the market, firms will compete less stren-
uously among themselves.1n Because potential entrants usually com-
Clayton Act) with United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427-29 (2d
Cir. 1945).
144. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333. 345 (S.D.N.Y.) "It
is not unreasonable to suggest that a court may act more readily to keep apart what
has never been joined together, than to dismember an existing entity which, in
general, has well served the public."), aff'd, 192 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1950). Thus,
courts seem more likely to resolve ambiguities in favor of the defendant in § 2 cases
and in favor of the government in § 7 cases.
145. Turner, supra note 5, at 1318. For the language of § 7, see note 11 supra.
146. Horizontal mergers are defined as "economic arrangement[s] between com-
panies performing similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or
services," Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962), or as mergers
between direct competitors. Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, [1977]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510, at 6883.
147. Vertical mergers have been defined as "'economic arrangements between
companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship," Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962), or as acquisition "backmard" into a supplying mar-
ket or "forward" into a purchasing market. Merger Guidelines of the Department of
Justice, [1977] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510, at 6885.
148. Conglomerate mergers are defined as mergers that are neither horizontal nor
vertical. This includes geographic or product extension mergers, that is, those involv-
ing two firms selling the same product in different geographic markets or similar
products in the same market. Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice,
[1977] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510, at 6887.
149. See Turner, supra note 5, at 1320-22; see notes 166-77 infra and accompany-
ing text.
150. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580, 597-604 (1967).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334, 344 (1962); notes 151-164 infra
and accompanying text.
151. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
152. Id. at 322 n.38.
153. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77 n.8 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). This is true for any firm wvith market power that oper-
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prise a major competitive force in these markets,5 courts are likely to
invalidate a merger that eliminates a potential entrant.,
Evidence of scale economies may also be introduced as a defense
in a section 7 case. Although the Supreme Court has held that eco-
nomic evidence in defense of a merger should not be considered
when the merger is horizontal 156 or conglomerate, 57 and usually
should be considered when the merger is vertical,'! no express dis-
tinction is made on the basis of policy or congressional intent. 9 Cir-
cuit and district courts have also taken inconsistent positions on the
appropriateness of scale economies as a section 7 defense. The Ninth
Circuit and one district court have rejected an operating efficiencies
defense in horizontal cases."16 In contrast, the First Circuit, the
ates behind barriers to entry. See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353 (2d
Cir. 1979).
154. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77 n.8 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
155. Id.; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1972) (court
applied "potential entrant" theory and found liability, but did not discuss scale
economies in relevant market).
156. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). In Phil-
adelphia National Bank, the Court held that if the merger results in a lessening of
competition and an increase in concentration, economic evidence in defense of the
merger would not be considered. Id. at 371. But cf. United States v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (" 'structure, history and probable future' "
of a market is relevant in determining the anticompetitive effect of a horizontal mer-
ger (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962))).
157. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (Clorox). In Clorox,
the majority held that possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality in
the context of a conglomerate merger when the effect of the merger was to entrench
the acquired firm in a dominant position. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Clorox, however, criticized the majority's analysis of economies. He argued that real
economies are an appropriate defense under § 7. Moreover, he noted the difference
between advertising economies and economies resulting from production, distribu-
tion, and marketing. Id. at 603 (Harlan, J., concurring). Economists call the savings
in advertising strictly pecuniary economies, and the others real economies. See notes
17-19 supra and accompanying text.
158. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In analogizing the
vertical aspects of the merger at issue, the Court stated that various economic and
historical facts should be considered when the percentage of the market foreclosed is
neither a monopoly nor de minimus. Id. at 328-29. The Court found that Congress
intended that the economic purpose of a vertical merger be considered. Id. at 319.
159. The trend, however, apparently is to consider economic evidence. See notes
5-6, 9 supra and accompanying text.
160. RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d 913, 936 (9th Cir. 1975); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 825-
27 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v, Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (citing congressional Intent to
halt the growing tendency toward increased concentration of power in spite of possi-
ble efficiency and lower cost to the ultimate consumer that may result from the
merger). But see Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 826 n.32 (9th Cir.
1961) (economies of scale specifically mentioned as a factor to consider).
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D.C. Circuit, one district court, and the FTC have argued that evi-
dence of scale economies resulting from a merger should be consid-
ered in defense of a merger under section 7.161
Some courts have suggested the extreme and clearly erroneous
position that a merger should be held unlawful because it results in
efficiencies. Specifically, they hold that a section 7 violation can be
established by proof that the merged firm will be more efficient than
its smaller competitors as a result of the merger."' This argument
unreasonably extends the populist notion that antitrust law should
protect small business, and fails to recognize that a reason for pro-
moting competition is that competition forces firms to operate
efficiently. 163
A more logical approach, implicit in recent Court decisions, is that
real economies are always procompetitive and should be weighed
against anticompetitive effects in all merger cases."" This balancing
161. Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177, 181-82 (1st Cir. 1975) (A § 2
case, analyzed using § 7 case law, held that entrenchment theory under § 7 makes
strictly pecuniary economies resulting from a merger unlawful. It does not hold,
however, that real economies resulting from a merger are unlawful.) Northern Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 399 F.2d 953, 967 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(merger doesn't result in use of excess capacity or make possible other economies of
scale; in fact, it is possible that scale economies were sacrificed in order to protect
the market from an independent competitor); United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co., 288 F. Supp: 543, 566 n.38 (N.D. 11. 1968) (in dicta, explicitly endorsed
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Clorox, which accepts a "real" scale economies
defense as the more logical approach); Beatrice Foods Co., [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,944, at 20,792 (F.T.C. 1975) C'improved effi-
ciency and price reductions are certainly no reason to condemn a merger not other-
wise shown to be anticompetitive").
162. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); Purex Corp. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1979): United States v. In-
gersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 554 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1963); Foremost Dairies Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962); see R. Bork, supra note 2,
at 6-7 (Because business efficiency lowers costs, it necessarily benefits consumers.
Therefore, when it is seen as a positive evil, the legality of business behavior that
results in efficiency will not be upheld. This is the worst possible result.).
163. Turner, supra note 5, at 1324-25. "This position is not only bad economics
but bad law .... mhe supposed purpose to preserve small business has never been
translated into rules banning conduct that was not arguably anticompetitive or harm-
ful in some other respect." Id.
164. Turner, supra note 5, at 1316-17; United States Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures, [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 992, 3-4 (Spec. Supp. Dec. 4, 1980); see note 7 supra and accompanying
text. The Justice Department explicitly endorses a balancing approach in analyzing
the competitive effects of a research joint venture under § 7 of the Clayton Act or §
1 of the Sherman Act. [1980] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 3. One example
that the Guide gives of a valid justification for a joint venture is when individual
firms cannot independently and efficiently finance research projects, presumably be-
cause this will increase innovation. Id. at 4. Moreover, joint research that replaces




approach is mandated by the clear economic effect of scale econo-
mies, the feasibility of various measurement techniques, and the im-
portance of efficiency as an antitrust goal," and is understood best
within the context of the three types of mergers.
Horizontal mergers are most likely to yield real scale economies in
production, research, distribution, cost of capital, management, skill,
and knowhow, as well as to allow the firm flexibility to alter produc-
tion levels so that each of its plants produces at minimum efficient
scale. '6 They are also most likely to result in anticompetitive
effects. 16 7 Moreover, even if strong antimerger standards were ap-
plied, the firm could probably achieve these economies by internal
expansion. In cases in which the benefits of scale economies
clearly outweigh anticompetitive effects, however, the merger never-
theless should be upheld.169
Vertical mergers are less likely to yield real scale economies, but
will often yield efficiencies of integration and firm scale economies."'
Because the anticompetitive effects of a vertical merger are more re-
mote than those of a horizontal merger, and barriers to entry are
likely to deter internal expansion, a strong policy against vertical
mergers is more likely to prevent scale economies from being
realized. 171 As with horizontal mergers, however, the facts of a speci-
fic case may alter this general balance and lead to invalidating a ver-
tical merger.7"
Conglomerate mergers generally result in few scale economies and
few anticompetitive effects. 73 Significant real economies from a pure
conglomerate merger are unlikely because the products of the acquir-
ing and the acquired firm generally are not interrelated.," Con-
glomerate mergers are likely, however, to yield strictly pecuniary
economies in management services, advertising costs, and capital
costs. 75 The savings in management and advertising are likely to be
165. See notes 6-7, 23, 29-62 supra and accompanying text.
166. Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 Geo. L.J. 672,
679-80 (1958); Turner, supra note 5, at 1317.
167. Turner, supra note 5, at 1320.
168. Id.
169. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962). But see
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
170. F. Scherer I, supra note 4, at 78-79. Vertical mergers are likely to result in a
more efficient arrangement of facilities from continuous production economies. Ver-
tical mergers may, however, introduce complications for a firm when the minimum
efficient scale for the two production processes is not the same.
171. Turner, supra note 5, at 1321.
172. Id. at 1330.
173. Blair, supra note 166, at 679-80; cf. Turner, supra note 5, at 1329 (Blair
overstates this principle).
174. Turner, supra note 5, at 1329.
175. Id. at 1330.
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greater when the products of the merging firms are similar.'" Al-
though it is possible that anticompetitive effects will result from a
conglomerate merger, it is not as likely as it is for either horizontal or
vertical mergers.'-' Thus, the required showing of beneficial economic
effects arguably should be less for conglomerate mergers. As with all
section 7 cases, courts should balance the merits of each case on an
ad hoc basis.7 8
CONCLUSION
A free market economy relies on market mechanisms to promote
social welfare. When the market mechanisms fail, market power re-
sults. The purpose of antitrust law is to control exercises of such pow-
er. Antitrust law, however, must be able to distinguish between exer-
cises of market power and aggressive business behavior that results in
social benefits. Application of economic theory to specific cases allows
courts to make that distinction. Promoting scale economies is one ex-
ample of business behavior that improves social welfare that could be
confused with the exercise of market power. Courts can use the work
of economists to identify and allow realization of scale economies. As
the arbiters of what constitutes beneficial economic behavior, courts




178. See notes 169, 172 supra and accompanying text.
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